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NEEDING CLOSURE ON DISCLOSURE: THE
APPLICATION OF R. v. STINCHCOMBE IN HUMAN
RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS
VINCENT KAZMIERSKit

I. INTRODUCTION
Human rights commissions were first introduced in this country as
an alternative mechanism to address complaints of discrimination.
From the outset, human rights proceedings were designed to
operate differently than criminal proceedings. While criminal
courts assess the guilt or innocence of an accused using the
reasonable doubt standard of proof, boards of inquiry assess
evidence according to the balance of probabilities. Moreover, the
boards of inquiry are mandated to compensate the victims of
discrimination, and not necessarily to punish the discriminators.
Despite these differences, boards of inquiry and courts alike
have started, in recent years, to compare criminal and human rights
proceedings and to hold human rights commissions to the same
standards of conduct as criminal prosecutors. This has been
especially evident with respect to the subject of disclosure. More
specifically, the issue of disclosure in the context of human rights
proceedings has been dramatically affected by the Supreme Court
of Canada's decision in R. v. Stinchcombe. 1
In Stinchcombe, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution
in criminal trials has a duty to make full disclosure to the defence
prior to trial. Despite the fact that this case dealt specifically with
the duty of disclosure in criminal cases dealing with indictable
offenses, some courts and tribunals have applied the Stinchcombe
standard to human rights proceedings. This comment will examine

Qt. Hons.) (McGill), M.A. (McGill), LLB. anticipated 1997 (Dalhousie).
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, [1992] l W.W.R. 97 [hereinafter Stinchcombe].

t B.A.
1

307

308

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

the issue of disclosure in the human rights context by examining
the approach to disclosure that existed prior to the Stinchcombe
decision and then proceeding to analyze cases that have either
applied or rejected the Stinchcombe approach in the context of
human rights proceedings.

II. DISCUSSION
1. The Pre-Stinchcombe Approach

Prior to Stinchcombe, human rights boards of inquiry operated
under the principle that there was no common-law right to
discovery and that any duty of disclosure thus had to be statutebased. As a result, most of the cases dealing with disclosure in
human rights proceedings involved the interpretation of statutes
such as Ontario's Statutory Powers Procedure Act. 2 Section 8 of the
SPPA states:
8. Where the good character, propriety of conduct or
competence of a party is an issue in any proceedings, the
party is entitled to be furnished prior to the hearing with
reasonable information of any allegations with respect
3
thereto.

In Veljko Dubajic et al. v. Wa!bar Machine Products of Canada
4
Limited, M. R. Gorsky, who was the sole member of the Ontario
Board of Inquiry, discussed the role of disclosure under section 8:
My view of s. 8 of the Act [Statutory Powers Procedure
Act, S.O. 1971, c. 47] is that it was introduced to
regulate one aspect of procedural natural justice which
must be followed by certain tribunals including a Board
of Inquiry appointed pursuant to s. 14(a)(i) of the Code.
Whatever the scope of the information which must be
furnished, its purpose is to define the issues and thereby
prevent surprise by enabling the party against whom the

2

3
4

Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.0. 1990, c. S.22 [hereinafter srrA].
SPPA, R.S.0. 1990, c. S. 22, s.8.
(1980), 1 C.H.R.R. D/228 [hereinafter Veljko Dubajic].
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allegations are made to prepare for the hearing. [emphasis
added]5

Gorsky stated dearly that the duty of disclosure under section
8 of the SPPA was in no way equal to a right to pre-hearing
discovery:
[U] nlike discovery in the Supreme Court, the
information does not include facts or documents which
might, in turn, result in the obtaining of evidence which
could assist in making the party's case.

I would agree with the statement of S. N. Lederman, in
his decision, dated March 11, 1976, in the case of Re
Nembard and Manradge and Caneruop Manufacturing
Limited, where he said at pp. 22-23, in commenting on
the meaning of s. 8 of the Act:
Prior to the hearing, a respondent
therefore is entitled to receive sufficient
information about the allegations to enable
him to prepare his answer to them. This
section does not, however, refer to advance
notice of documentary evidence but
merely to reasonable particularity of
6
allegations. . . .

A similar apfroach was adopted in Salamon v. Searchers
Paralegal Services. In Salamon, the respondent requested that the
Board of Inquiry issue a summons compelling the Ontario Human
Rights officer who investigated the complaint to appear and
produce several documents prepared during the course of the
investigation. The respondent also requested that the Commission
be made to provide the names of two witnesses it intended to
produce at the hearing. Both requests were rejected by the Ontario
Board of Inquiry, F. H. Zemans. Zemans stated:
I find that the respondents are not entitled to production
of the additional documents that they have requested,
for the following reasons. Firstly, section 8 of the SPPA is

5
6
7

Veijko Dubajic., supra note 4 at D/229.
Ibid. at 0/230.
(1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D/4164 [hereinafter Salamon].
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not broad enough to encompass pre-hearing discovery. It
requires only disclosure of 'reasonable information.'
There is no legislative provision for pre-hearing discovery
of documents ....
It is worth noting that these documents could be
inadmissible on other, independent grounds. Although I
am not making any specific findings as to privilege at
present, it is quite possible the documents the
respondents are seeking would be privileged and
therefore not producible....
I specifically would find that the names of witnesses are
within the form of privilege in Canada referred to by the
Canadian courts as the 'work product' or the 'lawyer's

file.'

8

Salamon indicated that the investigation file was potentially
insulated both as a result of the absence of a duty to disclose and as
a result of the existence of privilege. This privilege, it was suggested,
may have extended from the investigation file to the names of
witnesses who were to be produced at the hearing, so long as the
parties knew the substance of the case. Salamon became the benchmark for cases dealing with pre-hearing disclosure prior to
9
Stinchcombe.
The pre-Stinchcombe approach was summarized by Zemans, the
Board of Inquiry in Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Ontario
(Ministry ofEducation):
The Ontario case law would be clear that:
1. The complaint must contain all the 'essential elements'
including identification of the complainant and the
victim or the class being discriminated.

8

Salamon, supra note 7 at D/4164-0/4165.
See e.g. Adairv. KB. Home Insulation Ltd. (1991), 15 C.H.R.R. D/331 (Ont.
Bd. Inq.); Galev. Miracle Food Mart (No. 2) (1992), 17 C.H.R.R. D/495 (Ont. Bd.
Inq.); Galev. Miracle Food Mart (No. 3) (1992), 17 C.H.R.R. D/502 (Ont. Bd.
Inq.); Shrevev. Windsor (City) (No. 2) (1993), 18 C.H.R.R. D/363 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).
9
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2. The respondent must be aware of all matters which
form a 'substantial part of the facts material to the issues.'
Evidence in support of those facts need not be divulged.

3. The respondent must be provided with sufficient
information to allow it to prepare to meet all the
10
allegations against it.

This list amounted to little more than disclosure of the
particulars of the alleged offence and certainly did not include full
disclosure. Interestingly, however, Zemans noted that while
discovery was by no means required by statute, "Ontario boards of
inquiry have on numerous occasions expressed the view that foll and
frank disclosure before a hearing is desirable." [emphasis added] 11
2. The Post-Stinchcombe Approach

Without a doubt, the issue of disclosure in human rights
proceedings has been dramatically effected by the Supreme Court
of Canada's decision in Stinchcombe. However, the response of
boards of inquiry to Stinchcombe has not been uniform. Some
boards have adopted Stinchcombe as applicable to the human rights
context, while others have rejected it as inapplicable as a result of
the differences between criminal law and human rights proceedings.

i. Stinchcombe Denied
Some of the earliest cases after Stinchcombe rejected its applicability
to the human rights context. In Roosma v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada
12
(No. 3), the respondents argued that the Ontario Human Rights
Commission should be prevented from tendering the report of a
forensic accountant as evidence because the Commission had not
previously disclosed this material to the respondents. The Ontario
Board of Inquiry, Peter Mercer, ruled that previous disclosure of
the evidence, though desirable, was not necessary under the statute.
In so ruling, Mercer rejected the applicability of Stinchcombe to the
human rights context. Mercer stated:

10
II
12

(1986), 9 C.H.R.R. D/4535 at D/4536.

Ibid

(1992), 18 C.H.R.R. D/195 [hereinafter Roosma].

312

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

I do not accept this argument. Had the Commission
been both able and inclined to provide earlier disclosure
of the report, that would have been desirable. However,
there is no duty in law on the Commission to disclose a
report intended to be entered in reply prior to the closing
of the respondent's cases. Nor is the analogy with the
Crown's duty in Stinchcombe particularly apt; the
Commission's role under the Ontario Human Rights Code
[S.0. 1981, c. 53] is indeed not to be merely adversarial
but these proceedings are also clearly civil and not
13
criminal.

A similar ruling was made by W. Gunther Plaut, the Ontario
Board of Inquiry in Waterman v. National Life Assurance Co. of
14
Canada (No. 1). Plaut noted:
The question of the relation between criminal and human
rights law was recently considered by Prof. T. Brettel
Dawson in an interim decision under the Code, in the
matter of Hall v. A-1 Collision and Auto Service and Latif
(unreported, dated August 28, 1992, at 22 [now reported
17 C.H.R.R. D/204 at D/210, para 34]):
A Board of Inquiry does not determine
'guilt' but rather assigns responsibility
for a discriminatory act or practice. For
these reasons alone, I believe that it is
unwise to readily analogize grounds of
complaint in human rights legislation
with conduct controlled by the criminal
law and to apply protections developed
in the criminal law context to other
15
contexts.

Plaut later elaborated on this point:
In the instant case, and in the administration of the Code
in general, the investigation is not surrounded by the
prosecutorial aura associated with the police ....

13
14

15

Roosma, supra note 12 at D/195.
(1992), 18 C.H.R.R. D/173 [hereinafter Waterman].
Ibid at D/175.
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Respondent counsel has implied that there may be
evidence in the officer's notes which is withheld because
it is favourable to the respondent, and that therefore, as
in Stinchcombe, supra, the notes ought to be produced.
Personal experience leads me to believe that this
implication is unjustified. The officer comes to the
investigation without any apprehension of who is right
and who is wrong. The Commission becomes a partisan
only after the Commissioners, by vote, agree that a prima
facie infringement of the Code has occurred and
therefore ask the Minister to appoint a board of inquiry.
Until then, the commission is an impartial searcher for
the truth. Its agents and officers may not always carry
out their tasks to perfection, and certainly often are seen
as antagonists by potential respondents, but the kind of
truth shading of which the police in Stinchcombe were
suspected should not be laid at the door of the
16
Commission.

Finally, Crane v. McDonnell Douglas Canada Ltd. also provided
an interesting analysis of the contrasts between criminal cases and
17
human rights cases. Crane did not deal directly with the issue of
disclosure, but rather was concerned with the application of section
7 of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms 18 to the human
rights complaint process. John McCamus, the Board of Inquiry in
the case, rejected the analysis of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal,
which had accepted the application of section 7 of the Charter to
human rights complaints in Kodellas v. Saskatchewan Human Rights
19
Commission. Instead, McCamus ruled that section 7 of the Charter
is particularly unsuited to human rights proceedings.
Thus, for example, a human rights complaint may be
filed as of right and, therefore, unlike the laying of a
criminal charge, implies no suspicion on the part of an
investigating authority that wrongdoing has occurred.

16

Waterman, supra note 14 at D/175.
(1993), 19 C.H.R.R. D/422 [hereinafter Crane].
18 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (u.K.), 1982, c. 11. [hereinafter
Charter].
19
(1989), 10 C.H.R.R. D/173, [1989] 5 W.W.R. 1.
17
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Secondly, unlike criminal prosecutions, the identity of
complainants and respondents in human rights cases are
treated as confidential, at least in the early stages of an
investigation. Thirdly, a human rights proceeding is not a
prosecution 'by the state for a public offence involving
punitive sanctions.' The board of inquiry has no power to
fine or incarcerate respondents. Board orders are
compensatory in nature. Further, boards of inquiry have
no authority to impose pre-trial custody or bail
conditions. In short, the civil proceedings under the
Human Rights Code are, in these respects, quite unlike
criminal proceedings with respect to their impact on 'life,
20
liberty and security of the person.'

McCamus first two points have been eclipsed by subsequent
developments in human rights law; the third point, which focuses
on the compensatory nature of human rights proceedings, remains
relevant and important. Indeed, it seems that most of the
judgments that refused to apply Stinchcombe in a human rights
context did so because human rights proceedings are specifically
designed to be compensatory and not punitive in nature.

ii. Stinchcombe Applied
While the application of Stinchcombe to human rights proceedings
was rejected in these earlier cases, it has been accepted in more
recent cases. The most important board of inquiry decision that has
applied Stinchcombe is Christian v. Northwestern General Hospital
21
(No. 2). In Northwestern Hospital, the respondent hospital, which
had been accused of systemic discrimination, requested disclosure
of certain documents. The Ontario Human Rights Commission
claimed these documents were privileged because they related to
conciliation efforts or were accumulated in preparation for
litigation. The Board of Inquiry found that, due to the seriousness
of the allegations, the doctrine of disclosure established in
Stinchcombe should be applied despite the fact that Stinchcombe
was a criminal case and this was a human rights case:
[l]t appears to me that the allegations are very serious
indeed, with the potential if made out, to ruin

° Crane, supra note 17 at D/426.

2

21

(1993), 20 C.H.R.R. D/492 [hereinafter Northwestern
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reputations, and cas[t] a pall over the future career
prospects of anyone found to have so discriminated.
In a case such as this, I have decided that the Stinchcombe
doctrine, supra, ought to be applied. The exclusion of the
element of surprise in the interest of the fairness of a
hearing is, I believe, now required. Thus, any relevant
materials not otherwise
ought to be disclosed
to counsel for the respondents.

In addition, the Board of Inquiry distinguished between the
investigation, conciliation and prosecution stages of the human
rights process. The Board ruled that, unlike documents from the
conciliation and prosecution stages, documents from the
investigation stage are not privileged:
I prefer the reasoning of the panel in Dudnik, (supra at
D/334) which separates the investigation stage from the
subsequent conciliation stage, and, I would add, from the
third, "prosecution" stage, which arises once a board of
inquiry has been appointed. In my view, the panel in
Dudnik is correct that documents, including statements
reduced to writing, would only very exceptionally be
23
privileged at the investigation stage.

The Board of Inquiry's decision in Northwestern Hospital was
upheld on appeal by the Ontario Court of Justice:
The applicant equates proceedings under the Human
Rights Code to the civil rather than the criminal process. It
is in our view significant that in civil proceedings the 'full
discovery of documents and oral examination of parties
and even witnesses are familiar features of the practice.'
The important principle enunciated by Mr. Justice
Sopinka is that 'justice was better served when the
element of surprise was eliminated from the trial and the
parties were prepared to address issues on the basis of
complete information of the case to be met.'
It does not take a quantum leap to come to the
conclusion that in the appropriate case, justice will be

22
23

Northwestern Hospital supra note 21 at D/497.
Ibid at D/497.
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better served in proceedings under the Human Rights
Code when there is complete information available to the
respondents.

R. v. Stinchcombe, supra, also recognized that the 'fruits
of the investigation' in the possession of the Crown 'are
not the property of the Crown for use in securing a
conviction but the property of the public to be used to
ensure that justice be done' ([at] 331). We are of the
opinion that this point applies with equal force to the
proceedings before a board of inquiry and that the fruits
of the investigation are not the property of the
24
Commission. [emphasis added]

The Court also agreed that the investigation stage must be
distinguished from the litigation stage where a board of inquiry has
been appointed. While aware that complainants may be
discouraged from making complaints if they know their original
statements may later be disclosed, the Court found that this would
serve to make complainants take account of the seriousness of their
allegations:
However, it is of public importance as well that the
complainants appreciate that allegations of racial
discrimination are indeed serious and therefore should be
made in a responsible and conscientious fashion. The fact
that a complainant is aware that their original complaint
or complaints may be subsequently disclosed, might well
encourage complainants to take appropriate care in
25
communicating their allegations.

It should be noted that the decision of the Ontario Court of
Justice in House was recently followed by the Canadian Human
2
Rights Tribunal in Dhanjal v. Air Canada. In addition to following
the precedent established by the court in House, the Tribunal in
Dhanjal noted that the counsel for the Canadian Human Rights

24

Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. House sub. nom. Ontario (Human
Rights Commission) v. Ontario (Human Rights Board of Inquiry Northwestern Gen.
Hospital) (1994), 67 O.A.C. 72; 21 C.H.R.R. D/498 at 76-77 [hereinafter House
cited to O.A.C.].
25
Ibid. at 78.
26
[1996] C.H.R.D. No. 4 (Q.L.) [hereinafter
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Commission had acknowledged the Commission's duty to provide
full disclosure:
Although he communicated to us his reservations
concerning the complete applicability of the Stinchcombe
judgment to the Human Rights Tribunal, Mr. Pentney,
the Commission's General Counsel, nevertheless told the
Tribunal: 'With regard to the duty of full disclosure, trial
by ambush is in no one's interest, least of all the
Commission's. Commission counsel are bound to make
full and timely disclosure of the evidence which is
relevant and available to them, whether in the
investigation file or otherwise. This extends both to
evidence which tends to support the complaint and to
evidence which goes against the claim.' (transcript, p.
27
4563)

The effect of Stinchcombe was also considered by the
Saskatchewan Board of Inquiry in Andreen v. Dairy Producers
28
Cooperative Ltd. (No. I). In Andreen, the respondents requested
further particulars as well as access to information gathered by the
Commission during its investigation. The Board ordered the
Commission to provide the respondents with copies of written and
signed statements from witnesses unless the Commission
determined that they were not relevant to the inquiry and could
cause harm to a witness by being disclosed. The Board came to this
ruling after considering the effect of the Stinchcombe doctrine. The
Board stated:
Although we are very mindful of the fact that the current
inquiry is not a criminal procedure, we are somewhat
influenced that the Commission as an agency of the state
has considerable powers under the Human Rights Code.
Even though it may not be a complete parallel to
compare the role of the Commission with that of the
Ministry of Justice, it also is not a complete parallel to
treat the matters before this Board as purely private
matters pertaining to private parties. Thus, we will lean

27
28

Dhanjal, supra note 26 at para. 195.
(1993), 22 C.H.R.R. D/58 [hereinafter Andreen].
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toward full disclosure by the Commission of written and
29
signed statements which it has in its possession.

The Board of Inquiry in Andreen also placed the onus on the
Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission to establish that any
particular piece of physical evidence should not be disclosed.
Rather than placing the onus on the respondents to
establish that a particular piece of physical evidence is
relevant, we will pace (sic) the onus on the Commission
to establish that any particular piece of physical evidence
should not be disclosed. If the Commission feels that any
of the evidence clearly is not relevant and would be an
invasion of privacy of, or would otherwise harm particular
individuals, it can make its case to this Board of Inquiry.
Otherwise, we order that the respondents be given
reasonable access to all the physical evidence in possession
30
of the Commission.

Finally, it should be noted that, while the standard established
in Northwestern Hospital mandates broad disclosure, the Board left
the timing of disclosure to the discretion of the Commission.
However, in the human rights context, and more
particularly where, as here, an employer is among the
alleged human rights violators, the timing of disclosure
should be entirely in the hands of the Commission
counsel, whose decisions, absent a showing of oblique
motive must be respected as those of an officer in the
Court. It would be poor human rights code proceedings
indeed which demands too early disclosure of the
statements of witnesses in a context where they were
subject to harassment from those in authority. Similarly,
it may be that, in a given case, witness statements will
have to be edited prior to disclosure to insure that
identities may not be prematurely and inappropriately
31
disclosed.

29

Andreen, supra note 28 at D/62.

30

31

Ibid. at D/63.
Northwestern Hospital, supra note 21 at D/497
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The proper timing for disclosure was further addressed by
Katherine Laird, the Ontario Board of Inquiry in jack v. Metro
32
Toronto Reference Library.
The Commission has now made full disclosure of its file.
Although appropriate pre-hearing disclosure should have
been made well in advance of the commencement of this
hearing, a number of factors, including the retention of
outside counsel, delayed disclosure after appointment of
the Board. The scope of the disclosure certainly satisfies
the test established in Northwestern Hospital, supra. In
that case, the timing of the disclosure was held to be
appropriately left to the discretion of Commission
counsel. The timing in this case, although unfortunately
late, has not resulted in prejudice to the respondents that
could not be addressed by an adjournment. [emphasis
33
added]

Thus, while Northwestern Hospital allows the Commission to
determine the timing of disclosure, jack indicates that disclosure
should be made soon after the appointment of a board of inquiry.
However, late disclosure will not be viewed as an abuse of process so
long as it remains possible to correct any prejudice to the
respondent through an adjournment. Furthermore, while human
rights commissions continue to have discretion to limit disclosure
where they feel that disclosure would subject witnesses to
harassment, Andreen indicates that the onus is on human rights
commissions to show why disclosure should not be provided.

III. CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Stinchcombe has re-oriented discussion about disclosure in human
rights proceedings. Prior to Stinchcombe, disclosure was rarely
mandated by boards of inquiry and investigation reports as well as
witness statements were considered privileged information. More
recently, boards of inquiry have been applying the standard of
disclosure advocated in Stinchcombe to human rights proceedings.

32
33

(1994), 22 C.H.R.R. D/158 [hereinafter jack].
at D/164.

Ibid.
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As a result, disclosure has been mandated more frequently, and
information gathered at the investigation stage, including witness
names, has lost its privileged status.
The arguments against the application of Stinchcombe to a
human rights context are reflective of a broader debate concerning
the role of human rights legislation in contrast to criminal law. Of
these arguments, perhaps the most convincing is that human rights
legislation is focused on remedying acts of discrimination not on
punishing offenders. In light of this focus of human rights law, it is
disconcerting to say the least, to see loose comparisons with
criminal law made as frequently as has been the case in recent years.
Nonetheless, there are compelling arguments in favour of full
disclosure in the context of human rights proceedings. Human
rights commissions, like public prosecutors, should be focused on
ensuring that justice, not necessarily a finding of discrimination, is
the end result of their prosecutions. While comparing the role of
police and prosecutors in the criminal system with the role of
human rights commissions in human rights proceedings is not
appropriate in all circumstances, it is necessary to ensure that human
rights proceedings, like criminal proceedings, both are fair and
appear to be fair. In the words of Bruce Wildsmith, the Nova Scotia
Board of Inquiry in Gerin v. I.MP. Group Ltd.:"[t]o do justice to
the victims of discrimination, the Commission must provide a full
measure of fairness to the alleged perpetrators. "34
Full disclosure, within the bounds of reason and financial
constraints, is one way to ensure that the human rights complaint
process is fair and, perhaps more importantly, that it also appears to
be fair to the participants and to the public. While concerns about
the harassment of witnesses are well-placed, the existing case law
provides enough discretion for human rights commissions to deny
disclosure where it is either dangerous or not relevant.

34

[1996] N.S.H.R.B.I.D. No. 1 at para. 27 (Q.L.).

